Wednesday, August 27, 2008
"Alliance of the Left with Islam" and "Immigration is the Trojan Horse" in Oriana Fallaci's The Force of Reason
from Lionheart: Oriana Fallaci - The Force of Reason:
. . . some unanswered questions regarding the paradoxical alliance of the Left with Islam. The Left, and here Fallaci means Marxism, is steeped in dogmatism. By purveying its ideology as the one and only path to salvation, the Left resembles a religious creed . Like Islam, the Left is totalitarian.
It divides the world into the Good and the Bad, into comrades and infidel- dogs. And Like Islam, the Left never acknowledges its faults or errors.
Notice how the Left in Israel never acknowledges the monumental blunder of Oslo despite its disastrous consequences. (Fallaci might also have added that both the Left and Islam disdain the nation state or nationalism.)
In his tract, The Jewish Question, Marx displays a venomous hatred of Jewish particularism, resurrected in the Left's hatred of Zionism & Israel. Finally, the Left in Europe no longer has the Soviet Union to chart its course. Nor can it champion Europe's almost non-existent proletariat. And so, as our brilliant Oriana has discerned, the Left has turned its vaunted humanitarianism to the impoverished Third World, above all to
Fallaci concludes with three warnings. First, it's a mistake to believe that Islamic terrorism is the main weapon of the war Muslims have declared on us. Terrorism is only the bloodiest and most barbarous aspect of this war. The most pernicious and catastrophic aspect is the religious war, beginning with immigration. Immigration, not terrorism, she says, is the Trojan Horse that has penetrated and transformed Europe into Eurabia. Citing Bernard Lewis, she warns that by 2100, the whole of Europe will be numerically dominated by Muslims .
Read it all! Please! Before it is too late!
Lionheart: Oriana Fallaci - The Force of Reason
Monday, August 25, 2008
Training a “Hybrid” Warrior at the Infantry Officer Course by Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brian J. Donlon, Marine Corps Gazette
by Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brian J. Donlon, Marine Corps Gazette
It may be that the fight ahead will include many “Small Wars,” fought amidst the remains of the old Islamic Caliphate.
Speaking at the International Seapower Symposium on 17 October 2007, General Conway discussed the Marine Corps’ role in the new maritime strategy. Looking from the present to the years 2020-2025, the Commandant echoed oft repeated trends: that the average age in developed nations will continue to grow older while underdeveloped nations will grow younger, creating a population of military age males for whom employment opportunities will be scarce; that 75-80% of the world’s population will move towards an “urban sprawl” adjacent to a sea coast; and that state conflicts will continue to grow more rare as transnational and regional conflicts increase in scope and frequency. Largely due to these trends, the Commandant also spoke about the continuing likelihood of Marines being involved in complex irregular wars or what multiple experts have begun calling “hybrid” wars.
. . . . Largely due to these trends, the Commandant [General Conway] also spoke about the continuing likelihood of Marines being involved in complex irregular wars or what multiple experts have begun calling “hybrid” wars. (1)
As we enter the seventh year of “The Long War” the implications of these trends seem particularly significant, especially when, as the Commandant stated, one appreciates that a lot of “blue” exists on the map around the “Arc of Instability.” It may be that the fight ahead will include many “Small Wars,” fought amidst the remains of the old Islamic Caliphate. In the face of such a potential challenge, there has never been a more acute need for a “hybrid warrior,” possessing a mind capable of operating in timeless environments, conventional and irregular.
Note from SWJ:
In February  SWJ posted an entry “Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars?”
From that post: This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.
Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face “Hybrid Wars” that are a combination of traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.
Also, re a Hybrid War, see http://islamicdangerfu.blogspot.com/2008/08/lessons-from-lebanon-hezbollah-and.html
By Frank Hoffman
Mr. Hoffman is a retired Marine infantry officer and a graduate of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, George Mason University, and the U.S. Naval War College. He is a non-resident Senior Fellow of FPRI. This E-Note is adapted from Colonel Hoffman’s op-ed in Defense News, Aug. 14, 2006, with the gracious permission of the Editor.
The war in southern Lebanon revealed significant weaknesses in the posture of the Israeli defense force—and it has important implications for U.S. defense policy. The amorphous Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah represents a rising threat. Mixing an organized political movement with decentralized armed cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned zones, Hezbollah affirms an emerging trend. Highly disciplined, well trained, distributed cells can contest modern conventional forces with an admixture of guerrilla tactics and technology in densely packed urban centers. Hezbollah’s use of C802 anti-ship cruise missiles and volleys of rockets represents another advance into what some are calling “hybrid warfare.” [*]
Hezbollah lost a tremendous amount of its offensive firepower and a substantial amount of its infrastructure and trained fighting force. However, Israel failed to rout the Iranian-backed force, and may have lost the strategic battle of perceptions. Certainly, the Israeli Defense Force won the tactical battles, and Hezbollah’s arsenal of rockets is badly diminished. Claims about a victory for Nasrallah are a bit dubious in strictly military terms. But one thing is certain, the Israeli Defense Force’s credibility has been weakened and Hezbollah will come out of the conflict stronger in ideological appeal.
The war also underscores shortfalls in the approach to future conflict advocated by the U.S secretary of defense and his advisors. This is not apparent on the surface, but can be discerned in the (very few) programs actually under way to deal with the Hezbollah threat. More important, the approach advocated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review seriously underestimates the lethality of such irregular warfare. In theory, the Pentagon’s strategy is based upon the potential for an expanding range of future threats; including conventional, nontraditional, terrorists, and disruptive challengers. This expands the U.S. military’s mission set outside of its comfort zone and beyond its preference for fighting conventional forces, in similar uniforms and equipment, arrayed neatly in linear formations, preferably in open terrain. The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s policy experts realize that the U.S. military has myopically focused on battles against preferred enemies, vice campaigns versus thinking opponents, at the expense of U.S. security needs. Hezbollah clearly demonstrates the ability of nonstate actors to study and deconstruct the vulnerabilities of Western style militaries, and devise appropriate countermeasures.
The National Defense Strategy and the 2006 QDR quite properly recognized that future challengers will avoid our overwhelming military strengths and seek alternative paths. OSD’s senior civilian policy makers sought to shift the Department’s capability investments to meet these challengers. So far, the effort has produced more rhetoric than substance, with the exception of increased funding for Special Operations Forces (SOF). America’s “Shadow Warriors” have a valued place in today’s ongoing Long War, but there are limits to the rate at which we can grow SOF and limitations as to its operational utility in conflicts as seen in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
Just as significant, the report underestimates the looming scale and lethality of irregular warfare as a different form of warfare intended to erode America’s will and protract the costs of U.S operations. The QDR equates irregular warfare with simply counterterrorism and the defeat of terrorist networks. This over simplifies the problem as seen in Iraq and by Hezbollah’s defiant opposition. The problem is far bigger than just networks of terrorists; we face the emergence of Complex Irregular Warfare, which requires a more sophisticated response.
The Pentagon’s leadership appears to still believe in “cheap hawk” techniques including those that failed in Afghanistan and the Tora Bora. Ground forces were not augmented in the QDR; in fact, their strength was cut. Instead, the QDR placed emphasis on indirect approaches and pursuing “lines of least resistance.” Of course, out-thinking the enemy and exploiting vulnerabilities is the essence of great generalship. But strategy must rigorously match ends with means, and the Pentagon has continually shorted the Armed Services here. Rhetoric is grand but the funding has been thin as is the hope that such an indirect approach precludes the need to employ U.S. ground forces in a world in which anti-Americanism, ethnic divides, and Islamic clashes have produced a roiling stew of hatred and sectarian strife.
The Pentagon has yet to catch up to the front pages of the newspaper. Its multi-challenger threat perspective shifts the Department’s portfolio from an over-emphasis on conventional foes, but may not present the most likely or most challenging threat. Our greatest challenge will not come from a state that selects a single approach, but from states or groups that select from the whole menu of regular and unconventional tactics and technologies. Many analysts have captured these trends, with Russian, Australian, and American authors talking about “multi-modal” and “multi-variants” forms of war. A pair of Chinese Colonels are notorious for their conception of Unrestricted Warfare—or war without limits. Other American and British analysts have noted the fusion of regular and irregular modes of combat.
John Robb, a security analyst who operates a fascinating blog called Global Guerrillas, espouses the rise of Open Source warfare, which aptly captures the entrepreneurial and exploitive element of today’s enemies and their ability to acquire a purpose-built competitive force from available commercial sources.
Rather than the separate and distinct threats as found in the new National Defense Strategy, future scenarios will more likely present unique combinational or hybrid threats that are specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities. Conventional, irregular, and catastrophic terrorist challenges will not be distinct styles, they will all be present in some form. This could include states blending high-tech capabilities like anti-satellite weapons, with terrorism and cyber-warfare directed against financial targets. Conflicts will include hybrid organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, employing hybrid capabilities. States will shift their conventional to irregular formations and adopt new tactics, as Iran appears to be doing. Violence will not be a monopoly of states. We will face major states capable of supporting covert and indirect means of attack, as well as Thomas Friedman’s “super-empowered” fanatics capable of highly lethal attacks undercutting the sinews of global order.
Future opponents will be engage in what Marine Lieutenant General James Mattis has called “hybrid wars.” The term “hybrid” captures both their organization and their means. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit access to encrypted command systems, man-portable air to surface missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, IEDs, and coercive assassinations. Cunning savagery, continuous improvisation and rampant organizational adaptation will mark this form of warfare.
A force prepared for this environment would have to possess a unique set of expeditionary characteristics. In particular, this force would have to be prepared for protean opponents or known adversaries employing unpredicted tactics or asymmetric technologies. Such a force would be equally prepared to thwart very adaptive enemies by posing irregular, catastrophic or disruptive operations of its own. A force prepared to address hybrid threats would have to be built upon a solid professional military foundation, but it would also place a premium on the critical cognitive skills to recognize or quickly adapt to the unknown. As such, success in future conflicts places a greater priority on rapid—if not continuous—organizational learning and adaptation.
The U.S. military is struggling to identify effective counter-measures against irregular and hybrid threats. Too much emphasis has been placed on laminating old case studies from Colonial era wars and rural Maoist insurgencies against today’s more lethal threats. There is much to learn from history but it rarely repeats itself. In the Army’s call for full spectrum “pentathletes,” and in its cutting edge counter-insurgency doctrine and education efforts led by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus at Fort Leavenworth, one sees great progress. So too with the Marine Corps efforts to incorporate cultural intelligence and language training, as well as its experimentation with Distributed Operations. Persistent contact with local populations to establish security and actionable intelligence, and persistent pressure against an elusive cellular adversary can only be achieved with highly trained forces prepared to “find and fix and finish” nimble guerrillas. John Boyd, an Air Force theorist and brilliant strategist, stressed that in irregular wars the predator must be more creative than the prey—and relentlessly penetrate his sanctuary to disrupt his cohesion. The IDF attempted this in Lebanon but was far from successful, which should provide a warning to the Pentagon.
Irregular wars in general, and hybrid wars in particular, reflect a style of war in which “finding and fixing” the opponent in a congested urban complex or in complex terrain is usually much more difficult than actually “finishing” him. Part of this is the nature of the terrain and the proximity of the guerrillas to non-combatants. The irregular’s focused efforts to purposely adapt to his environment like a chameleon is another complication. We can see this trend playing out in Afghanistan and in Lebanon as well. Success in hybrid wars requires small unit leaders with decision-making skills and tactical cunning to respond to the unknown—and the equipment sets to react or adapt faster than tomorrow’s foe.
Success also requires soldiers and Marines who understand the non-kinetic aspects of irregular warfare too. In Hybrid Wars, any act—violent or non-kinetic—and the ideological exploitation of its results are must be as tightly coordinated as a close air strike. The discriminate use of force is critical to ensure that its application does not impair the political and psychological dimensions of the conflict. Here the Department of Defense and the Services can and should do more.
DoD has supposedly unshackled itself from its infatuation with space based missile defenses, networks of sensors and information systems, and stand-off warfare. However, one glance at the DoD procurement budget suggests otherwise. We are still over investing in major platforms for shock and awe, and under-investing in U.S. ground forces. Building up the indigenous forces in situations like Iraq is correct. Enhancing the capabilities of under-governed states is smart and proactive. However, we cannot always count on proxies, surrogates and partners to achieve American interests. Success in today’s urban contested zones and ungoverned spaces mandates that DoD refocus its efforts and resources on the hard-edged and most relevant of American tools—its land forces—for hybrid wars.
 See Frank G. Hoffman, “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs,” Orbis, Summer 2006.
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Sunday, August 24, 2008
from Is it Wrong to Use Moslems . . . to fight Moslems?
And look at this:
"Both Boyd and Sun Tzu advocate the ideas of harmony, deception, swiftness and fluidity of action, surprise, shock, and attacking the enemy's strategy".--from WARFARE
Saturday, August 23, 2008
by Yaron Brook and Alex Epstein
Who is the enemy that attacked on 9/11? It is not “terrorism”—just as our enemy in World War II was not kamikaze strikes or U-boat attacks. Terrorism is a tactic employed by a certain group for a certain cause. That group and, above all, the cause they fight for are our enemy.
The group that threatens us with terrorism—the group of which Al Qaeda is but one terrorist faction—is a militant, religious, ideological movement best designated as “Islamic Totalitarianism.” The Islamic Totalitarian movement, which enjoys widespread and growing support throughout the Arab–Islamic world, encompasses those who believe that all must live in total subjugation to the dogmas of Islam and who conclude that jihad (“holy war”) must be waged against those who refuse to do so.
Islamic Totalitarians regard the freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly happiness animating the West (and especially America and Israel) as the height of depravity. They seek to eradicate Western Culture, first in the Middle East and then in the West itself, with the ultimate aim of bringing about the worldwide triumph of Islam. This goal is achievable, adherents of the movement believe, because the West is a “paper tiger” that can be brought to its knees by sufficiently devoted Islamic warriors.
NOW THAT WE KNOW WHO HE IS--HIS NAME--HOW DO WE DEFEAT THE ENEMY?
What specific military actions would have been required post-9/11 to end state support of Islamic Totalitarianism is a question for specialists in military strategy, but even a cursory look at history can tell us one thing for sure: It would have required the willingness to take devastating military action against enemy regimes—to oust their leaders and prominent supporters, to make examples of certain regimes or cities in order to win the surrender of others, and to inflict suffering on complicit civilian populations, who enable terrorist-supporting regimes to remain in power.
Observe that nearly five years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11—longer than it took to defeat the far more powerful Japanese after Pearl Harbor—the two leading supporters of Islamic Totalitarianism and the majority of their accessories remain intact and visibly operative. Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, led by a President who declares that our ally Israel must be “wiped off the map,” and by Mullahs who lead the nation in weekly chants of “Death to America.” Abroad, Iran's terrorist agents kill American troops in Iraq, while its propagandists attempt to push Iraq into an Islamic theocracy.
Saudi Arabia continues to fund schools and institutions around the world that preach hatred of America and advocate Islamic Totalitarianism. Syria remains the headquarters of numerous terrorist organizations and an active supporter of the Iraqi insurgency that is killing American troops. The Palestinian Authority continues a terrorist jihad initiated by Yasser Arafat—a jihad that can be expected only to escalate under the entity's new leadership by the Islamic Totalitarian group Hamas. Throughout the Arab–Islamic world, “spiritual leaders” and state-owned presses ceaselessly incite attacks against the West without fear of reprisal.
America has done nothing to end the threat posed by Iran and Saudi Arabia, nor by Syria and the Palestinian Authority.
More, much more at http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2006-spring/just-war-theory.asp#_edn1
Read it all!
Friday, August 22, 2008
Replacing the Majority by selective "immigration," "breeding," and economic "equalization:"
. . . our present-day rulers, who have the temerity to pretend that 'representative government' still exists, do in fact harbor the intent to replace us or 'breed us out'.
Replacing the Majority by selective "immigration," "breeding," and economic "equalization:"
More at Goodbye to All o' That - Goodbye to A White Majority in America (New Material added!)
from "1314, 2042, and all that"
Show me a sergeant who finds the enemy and a general who denies it and I will show you an army that wants defeat against its real enemies. The sergeant is telling the brass the truth about Islam and the brass is lying to itself. That is what the French brass did in World War I. The result was death in the trenches. France fell on the inside because its generals didn’t listen to what sergeants told them from the front lines.
The generals and politicians who kiss the Koran are fighting from the rear in a war of ideas. They imagine the battlefield and then give orders that make no sense. In the battle of the 21st century, the Koran shows the face of the enemy. That is where the battle is.
Sergeants learn this from experience. Generals deny it from a false PC theory of war that is a prescription for defeat. These generals can win battles on the battlefield up to the last one, which they will lose because they ignored what the sergeants told them about the Koran by shooting it. The Koran is the enemy and must be destroyed completely.
[Caveat by Old Atlantic Lighthouse]
The above is a spoof and in no way represents the views of the U.S. military, George W. Bush or the PC-perverted belief system known as Islam is the Religion of Peace.
Old Atlantic Lighthouse
(Patton Kicks Ass of Koran Kissing General Spoof)
COMMENT by lw:
This is "A Time for Sergeants"
Venezuelan Ties to Hizbullah
Obama and Chavez
Trouble from the South - Latin American Danger
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini understood the astonishing power that conspiracy theories have over the minds of Muslims. After Islamic fundamentalists seized and occupied the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, Khomeini declared that America and its “corrupt colony, Israel,” were really pulling the strings behind the takeover of the mosque. There followed an upsurge of violent anti-Americanism in Libya, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan; in Islamabad a mob burned down the U.S. embassy.1
The destructive influence of anti-Muslim conspiracy theories, though, is graver than the concrete damage caused by rampaging mobs. Suffusing the cultural atmosphere of the Arab–Islamic world, such theories project the fiction that Muslims, their values, and their culture are beleaguered. By doing so, these theories both express and foment hostility toward the supposed enemies of Islam: America, Israel, and the West in general. Conspiracy theories instill and sustain in the public mind rationalizations for waging war in defense of Islam and for rejecting the values of the West (ideals such as political and economic freedom thus face an arduous struggle to take root in the Middle East).
Perhaps the most notorious and prevalent anti-Muslim conspiracy theory is The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. Originating in Russia in the early 1900s, this tract purports to reveal the nefarious secret plans of a Jewish cabal to undermine the health, family life, and morality of non-Jews. These elders allegedly seek a monopoly on international finance and thereby to achieve world domination. The Protocols was exposed as a fiction in the West in the early 1920s—at roughly the time that Arabic translations of it began appearing in the Middle East. That it has long been discredited in the West has done nothing to diminish the appeal of The Protocols to Muslims.2
Instead, the book has become a fixture of the culture’s intellectual life. It has been reissued umpteen times in Arabic, and there have been more translations and editions of it in Arabic than in any other language. Gamal Abdel Nasser, while he was president of Egypt, gave away copies to foreign journalists; Saudi Arabia’s government likewise distributed copies to visitors and at Saudi Arabian embassies; and Khomeini’s regime brought the book to prominence in Iran. The charter of Hamas, the Islamic terrorist group, explicitly refers to The Protocols and recycles its mythic claims. The book has been included in the curriculum of schools in Jordan, and for a period in the 1970s it became a nonfiction best seller in Lebanon.3 Major television adaptations of it have appeared in Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan (a recent Iranian television program posturing as a documentary claimed to prove how, in accordance with The Protocols, Jews control Hollywood and use movies to advance a pro-Zionist agenda).4
And the fabrication of new conspiracy theories, conveying the same general theme expressed in The Protocols, continues apace: The genocide in Sudan; the bombings on the London underground; and the attacks of September 11, 2001, were supposedly orchestrated by America (or Israel or the Elders of Zion) to defame, undermine, and injure Muslims.
While political and intellectual leaders in the Arab–Islamic world comprehend the power of anti-Muslim conspiracy theories, in the West this malignant phenomenon remains little understood. Why do patently false stories, harping on supposedly omnipresent threats, proliferate among Muslims? The answer reveals a profound—and ominous—insight into the Arab–Islamic mind. . . .
Full article accessible to subscribers
In The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, Daniel Pipes, a Middle East scholar and columnist, sheds light on a broad range of conspiracy theories and their purveyors. The book, published a decade ago, is valuable as a field guide, because it points to evidence that is important for understanding why conspiracy theories flourish in the Middle East. Pipes presents several case studies and goes on to catalogue the general features of conspiracy theories and their promulgators. His explanation for the abundance of conspiracy theories is illuminating; his account, however, does not pierce deep enough.
With the help of Pipes’s findings, we can uncover the fundamental cause by exploring the character of the conspiracist mentality, its musings, and motivations.
A clue to that cause is the conspiracist’s brazen contempt for facts. The conspiracist’s tales precede—and typically contradict—facts. The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion claims to reveal a plot based on little more than racist hostility and innuendo (such as the prominence of Jews in finance). The obscene conjectures about the 9/11 attacks arbitrarily concoct a bizarre stew of falsehoods (such as the notion that the Bush administration staged the attacks to justify a war). From the scores of alleged plots that Pipes discusses, one can discern a recurring theme that unites them. The theories convey a specific belief to which the conspiracist is committed: that forces are working to impoverish, corrupt, subjugate, and destroy the Muslim world.
The conspiracist’s emotional commitment to this belief renders evidence and logic to the contrary irrelevant. Scraps of pseudo-evidence—if offered at all—are afterthoughts invoked for the sake of convincing others. Inconvenient facts are dismissed. As Pipes observes:
Focusing on what fits his thesis, the conspiracy theorist ignores everything else. A ferocious war took place in Afghanistan that lasted a decade and pitted the U.S.-backed mujahidin forces against the Soviets and their allies. The Khomeini regime somehow disregarded this major conflict on its border and insisted on U.S.–Soviet collusion in Afghanistan. In its fantastical interpretation, the great powers had joined together in a plot “to sow discord among the mujahidin” with the ultimate aim of breaking Muslim solidarity.5
These theories consist of allegations divorced from reality; they contain gaping holes and evade obvious facts; the result is a heap of arbitrary and contradictory details vaguely advancing the recurring theme. As more allegations of conspiracy are added, the theories become more densely complex and more bizarrely contradictory.
The conspiracist shields his theory from that which to a rational person would be clear counterevidence. His criterion for considering something as supportive of his claim is wildly permissive, but (according to Pipes) the standard for what would overturn his claims is stringent. And so, not even the patently self-sacrificial actions of Washington can shake the presumption of surreptitious American aggression against Muslims.
There was nothing for America to gain (and it lost much) in the “humanitarian” deployment of troops to Somalia in 1992. U.S. troops were sent to save the lives of foreigners, but according to Muslim conspiracists the mission in Somalia was a subterfuge. Pipes reports that
A Jordanian newspaper saw mass starvation as a new U.S. “scheme aimed at creating further tension” to justify “the dispatch of its war machine.” Iraqi media accused the U.S. government of having “exploited the Somali people’s tragedy” in Somalia and giving American soldiers a “license to kill at will.” The People’s Arab and Islamic Congress, a fundamentalist group, claimed the U.S. purpose was not feeding people but just the reverse: “genocide” against the Somali people.6
Certain governments regarded such missions as acts of U.S. colonialism, and so did the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist group. According to this organization, “On the pretext of providing food aid and achieving peace, the United States is conducting a new colonial policy in a world approaching the 21st century, using U.N. institutions for the plan.”7 America’s 1995 military effort in Bosnia—hardly a mission serving U.S. self-interest—was similarly seen as a ruse. Although U.S. bombing raids on Serbs benefited Muslims, Muammar Qadhdhafi of Libya maintained that only “the naïve and simple-minded” would be fooled into believing that this was Washington’s goal. The actual purpose, he explained, was American “revenge on Yugoslavia, the leader of neutrality and the Non-Aligned Movement.”8
To orchestrate such massive feints the plotters must be, and so are depicted as, awesomely powerful. There is, seemingly, no limit to the cunning and intricacy of the conspirators’ schemes. The unseen leadership, claims one conspiracist, “chooses its agents, puppets, and pawns well in advance and motivates and moulds them by many methods.” Pipes quotes a young Western-educated Jordanian businessman who explains why Israel expelled a group of four hundred Palestinians in 1992:
[Israel] created the Hamas organization in order to foil Palestinian nationalism. But Israel’s grip on the leadership was slipping. So the Israelis selected a new group of leaders and, together with several hundred decoys, shipped them off to Lebanon, where they will become heroes of the struggle. Eventually the Israelis will allow them to return, where they will form the new Hamas power structure. Then Israel will once again be fully in control.9
The plotters are able to do all this in part because they have billions of dollars and copious resources at their disposal, including (as one conspiracist claims) the “media, industry, technology, oil, military hardware, and the intelligence agencies led by Mossad and CIA.” The plotters’ agents abound. Israel, allegedly, has “eleven million ambassadors, spies, financiers and company representatives in the world” who, presumably, work covertly. But even Muslims, including heads of state, have been accused of being covert Jews or otherwise in league with plotters. The Egyptian Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb alleged that there is a “massive army of agents in the form of professors, philosophers, doctors and researchers—sometimes also writers, poets, scientists and journalists—carrying Muslim names because they are of Muslim descent” but working for the Zionist cause.10
What motivates the purportedly omnipotent plotters’ hostility toward Muslims? Pipes identifies many motives: wealth, hatred for Islam, lust for power, sheer malice. Commenting on the abundance of conspiracies in revolutionary Iran, Pipes writes that “Despite their mortal differences, the shah, his leftist opposition and Khomeini all agreed that the West seeks to steal Iranian resources. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi worried that ‘as Iran continued to grow and prosper, we would become an increasingly attractive prize for foreign predators.’” Followers of Khomeini claimed that European and American predators are bent on “devouring the rich resources of the Middle East.”11
The fundamental factor underlying the motives ascribed to conspirators—though Pipes does not identify it—is a moral estimate. The two dominant camps of plotters—Jews/Israelis/Zionists and Europeans/Americans/Crusaders—are non-Muslim and materialistic, and therefore immoral and hostile to Muslims. Sayyid Qutb explained how the un-Islamic predators believe that the most basic needs of man are those shared with animals, “food, shelter and sex.” Indeed, opposition to the teachings of Islam is frequently emphasized by Muslim fundamentalists as the prime motive for conspiracies. Khomeini claimed that “The Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world. Since they are a cunning and resourceful group of people, I fear—god forbid!—they may one day achieve their goal.”12 The supposed enemies of Islam purportedly seek sometimes to Judaize or Christianize the Middle East, and sometimes to act out of a hatred that is an end in itself. Sometimes the “they” who plot remain unnamed; that they conspire against Muslims is enough of an identification.
For these reasons, conspiracy theories are an effective tool for deflecting blame—and have been so used. A given regime can invoke a conspiracy implicating foreign interests in order to explain away a crippled economy or some military debacle. In the Iran–Iraq War, for example, both sides alleged that the other was the instrument of a Western/un-Islamic conspiracy. According to Baghdad, Iran was encouraged to launch the war to hobble Iraq’s economy and keep it from modernizing, thus protecting the economic interests of the West; according to Teheran, the war was an arrogant, blasphemous attack against faith engineered by the impious West.13 Political leaders such as the last shah of Iran, Nasser of Egypt, and Saddam Hussein have frequently promulgated conspiracy theories to rationalize their failures. The use of conspiracy theories to shrug off responsibility, in Pipes’s view, is pervasive and suggests the explanation for their flourishing.
Noting that “Arabs and Iranians today blame others for everything from a poor tomato crop to a military defeat,” Pipes argues that conspiracy theories serve as a means of coping with unpleasant facts. Muslims find solace by blaming their problems on the evils of the West. But, he observes, “Muslims did not resort to conspiracy theories or other facile explanations to account for their failings until sometime after the year 1800”; in ancient and pre-modern Islamic culture there was a paucity of conspiracy theories. This fact is crucial, because it implies that some historical change—some devastating calamity—is responsible for the burst of conspiracy theories in the last two centuries.14
That pivotal event was the Islamic world’s awakening, at the close of the 18th century, to the fact of its weak and impoverished status relative to the West. After centuries of basking in the fading afterglow of imperial glory, after centuries of looking down on Europeans as barbarians unworthy of consideration or fear, Muslims found themselves in a world that had somehow gone awry. As the people of Allah, they were promised worldly success; however, they were, and continue to be, mired in stagnant poverty and military inferiority compared with the Western infidels.
A cultural crisis ensued “as the Muslims’ traditional sense of superiority vis-à-vis Christian Europeans rapidly turned into pervasive insecurity. An official at the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem captured the plaintive quality of this situation: ‘Before we were masters of the world, and now, we’re not even masters of our own mosques!’”15 Rather than admit error and adopt rational ideas, many in the Middle East sought ways to justify their traditional beliefs. Their fall from grace, they felt, must be the result of Western treachery: “were it not for Western intrigues against Islam, they tell themselves, Muhammad’s people would still enjoy their former superiority over Europe.”16 Hence the embrace of conspiracy theories to blame the failures of Islamic culture on outside forces. Pipes writes that this response “reveals more about the [conspiracist’s] unwillingness to take responsibility for himself than about the actual behavior of others.”17
But, while Pipes’s account is enlightening, there is more to the appeal of conspiracy theories. The refusal to take responsibility for failures is not causless—nor is the willingness of Muslims to invent and act on flagrantly irrational conspiracy theories.
To understand the mass appeal of such fictions, recall their fantastic character. The data that Pipes has gathered suggest a point that remains implicit in his discussion. These conspiracies theories are, in effect, a superficially secular vocabulary for an essentially superstitious outlook. The conspiracist posits omnipresent, mysterious, malicious, and awesomely powerful forces that leave no fingerprints and that wield unlimited resources; apparently nothing is impossible to them. Instead of calling those omnipresent forces jinn (spirits) or the “evil eye,” the conspiracist conceives of America or Israel or Britain as the evil force possessing the powers of spirits. And so these nations allegedly have unlimited powers to wreak havoc and imperil Muslim values.
Conspiracy theories, in short, are infused with mysticism. The theories are not merely perversely irrational, they are contemptuous of the faculty of reason as man’s means of knowledge. The conspiracist “theorizes” in order to bolster a preexisting belief that he regards as true without evidence and in defiance of logic. The absence of evidence, to a conspiracist, is not a weakness in the theory. Evidence is not his standard.
Though it is unsupported by facts or logic, the conspirator steadfastly clings to his belief. The source of his belief is faith—the blind acceptance of some idea sustained by feeling in the absence or defiance of evidence. This epistemology, or philosophy of knowledge, is a fundamental tenet of Islam, as it is of all religions. And this is key to understanding the conspiracist mentality.
Pipes’s explanation seriously understates the fundamental role of religion. He considers Islam as one factor among others but rejects it as the principal cause for conspiracy theories, because “Long-established faiths such as Zoroastrianism and Islam change too little to explain the burst of conspiracism in modern times.”18 But observe that a basic supernaturalism and a commitment to faith are the common, recurring features of these conspiracy theories. That Islam and Zoroastrianism have changed little over the centuries may well be true, and Pipes is right to look for a historical turning point as a trigger. Yet it is the continuity of religion’s monopoly on the lives and minds of Muslims that is telling.
The reaction of Muslims to the unpleasant reality confronting them, during their historical awakening and ever since, is colored by their fundamental view of reality and of man’s place in it—colored, in other words, by their philosophy of life, Islam. The Muslim world’s bitter realization of inferiority was first felt on the battlefield more than two hundred years ago and continues to rankle. As one historian (whom Pipes quotes) observed, for Muslims “military defeat was not defeat only in a worldly sense; it also brought into doubt the truth of the Muslim revelation.”19
The conspiracist’s belief in the existence of malicious plots seeking to thwart his values, his culture, and his religion is not merely an echo of a superstitious outlook. His entrenched belief and the fear that follows from it are consequences of the fact that he scorns reason and takes faith seriously. The man who shuns facts and logic has jettisoned the means of achieving values and dealing with the world successfully. By relinquishing his means of gaining real knowledge, he renders himself ignorant of the workings of the real world; thus, the world comes to feel like an alien realm to him, a realm in which he does not belong. He rightly feels a lack of control over his life; he feels helpless—because, given his epistemology, he is. He regards the world as inimical to his life—because his cognitive orientation cripples his pursuit of values. He discounts rational explanations identifying earthly causes that he could learn to enact, and instead, imagines supernatural ones that are perforce out of his control.
Taking faith seriously, he looks at the wealth of the West and rather than ask, “What knowledge is required to produce such technological advancement and wealth?” he wonders petulantly, “By what stratagems did the West appropriate that wealth?” The presumption is that understanding the world is irrelevant; success or power or wealth comes as a gift from the gods—or else is stolen from those who are its rightful (because pious) recipients.
The conspiracist believes that his faith should bring him more success than the infidels, but it is they who surpass him. To contemplate the possibility of error here is to contemplate the inefficacy of faith, which, of course, his religion forbids; thus, he is driven to deflect blame and to conjure alternate explanations. Pipes rightly identifies a drive to find excuses, but it is a consequence of the epistemology of faith. The egregiously irrational excuses are an expression of mysticism taken seriously.
Because the conspiracist’s view does not require evidence for belief, he can arbitrarily cast himself as the righteous victim of conspiracies. He freely paints Americans, Israelis, and Europeans as conspiring evildoers because, judged according to Islamic ethics, they are irreligious and thus could not be otherwise. From this irrational “explanation” flows an irrational solution: Since piety really is the means to strength and prosperity, Muslims must rededicate themselves accordingly and confront the infidels.
This perverse mentality is hardly confined to Muslims. The militant subjectivism of Muslim conspiracists is matched, if not surpassed, by that of Christianity. Conspiracy theories of the kind that thrive today emerged during the Church’s domination over Europe, in the era of the Crusades. Christians scorned Jews as infidels and thus enemies of the faith; this evaluation spawned accusations of Jewish conspiracies against Christians—hence the fears that Jews desecrated Christian religious objects—hence the calumny that Jews murdered Christian children to use their blood in rituals—hence the charge that they schemed to poison wells and thereby wipe out Christians. This line of anti-Jewish conspiracies has endured in the West and has left a deep imprint on the Arab–Islamic world, where conspiracy theories have burgeoned.
The widespread appeal of conspiracies—not just among fundamentalists but also among ostensibly secular Muslims—is revealing of the intellectual character of the Middle East. As one scholar (quoted by Pipes) observed, the presumption of conspiracy is such that for an Iranian to ignore it is “(a) to indicate ignorance of the superior forces around oneself or one’s nation and (b) to demonstrate the stupidity, naïveté or insensitivity not to perceive the hidden motive of others.”20 The public’s belief in that presumption enables political leaders such as Arafat, Nasser, and Hussein—who are far from being fundamentalists—to promulgate conspiracy theories, confident that their arbitrary assertions will be taken seriously. This is a keen indication of the degree to which the widespread acceptance of faith informs the thinking even of those who would consider themselves nonreligious.
The avid consumption of conspiracy theories belies the sanguine assumptions of many in the West about the intellectual climate and the prospects for civilized society in the Middle East. Although large numbers of the Muslim public may travel by car rather than on mule, wear blue jeans and business suits rather than flowing robes, eat at McDonald’s rather than at traditional food stands—what they believe remains profoundly pre-scientific, mystical, and dangerous. They may watch television (perhaps even beamed in by satellite) but what they hear on news programs all too often are conspiracy theories echoing an outlook that is hostile to facts, logic, and reason. They want to regard Israel or the United States as a villain, and therefore they do, regardless of what either country actually says or does. They want to regard diplomacy as a pretense, and therefore they do. They want to see themselves as noble victims, and therefore they do. The consumers of conspiracy theories accept these stories because the theme comports with their basic philosophic outlook—because they take faith seriously.
For U.S. policy-makers and others concerned with the Middle East, this presents a formidable challenge. A culture that laps up conspiracy theories is not only susceptible to political manipulation by dictators and demagogues, it is also stirred to action by calls to defend its faith and culture from the alleged predations of the West. Islamic fundamentalists have found—and will continue to find—many eager recruits. New volunteers joining the Islamist jihad against the West are streaming into Iraq from across the Middle East and farther afield.
The conspiracist mentality is widespread and entrenched in the Arab–Islamic world. What engenders and sustains it is the epistemology of faith; armed and unleashed, this mentality is a real threat to the civilized world.
Return to Spring 2006 contents
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BUT, according to the American Historical Association (AHA):
" . . . serious historians" know that "there are no lessons of history." . . . history is only the "contemplation" of the past.
To them, everything is the subjective creation of gender history, . . . how the average man lived, or the "history" of oppressed peoples.
The difference[between the American Historical Association (AHA) and the Society for Military History (SMH)] starts with the membership: the AHA is almost totally academic, while the SMH has a large number of historians working directly with military units, either in uniform or as civilians.
comes this post:
The Society for Military History: A Report from the Front
Posted by John David Lewis
I just returned from the national conference of the Society for Military History (SMH), held at Kansas State University. I presented a paper on the military campaigns of the Roman Emperor Aurelian, arguing that his use of overwhelming force had resulted in a bloodless collapse of two major threats to Rome. At the conference I also had a chance to tour the combat simulation exercises at Fort Riley, to visit the National Cavalry Museum and the Eisenhower Center, and to hear a speech by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers.
From the outset the conference set an utterly different tone than one hears at America's largest historical enclave, the American Historical Association. The difference starts with the membership: the AHA is almost totally academic, while the SMH has a large number of historians working directly with military units, either in uniform or as civilians. The opening speaker at the SMH said two things that I have never heard at the AHA: he praised our "passion for facts," and he urged us to write history always "with practical value for today." The purpose of history, I heard repeatedly at the conference, was to place modern events into an historical context, and to offer people—civilians, officers and soldiers—a means to better understand the present, and to plan for the future.
People not involved in academia may not understand how refreshing this was to me. At the AHA, outright hostility will usually greet such claims. I have sat on history panels where the first thing said is "there are no facts—only interpretations; and there are no lessons—only the contemplation of complexity." I have been in job interviews where the committee members' eyes glaze over when you even mention political, intellectual or military history. To them, everything is the subjective creation of gender history, "queer" studies, how the average man lived, or the "history" of oppressed peoples. It's all generally disgusting, irrelevant to understanding human events, and downright boring.
At the SMH, the experience was different in kind. One military officer stated publicly that his job was to write history in order to help military officers make better command decisions. I told him privately that a piece of my work had been delayed in publication because an anonymous reader had written that my work was not history. Why had the reader come to this conclusion? Because I had written of lessons from the past, to which the reader replied: "serious historians" know that "there are no lessons of history." To him, history is only the "contemplation" of the past. At the AHA, this is accepted doctrine. But the officer at the SMH nearly shouted back "He's an idiot!!" I agree. The officer deals with situations where HISTORY MATTERS. He works under deadlines, is evaluated by his superiors, and trains soldiers who are going into combat. If they don't recognize facts, they die. In contrast, the average academic has no one to please except other academics, who usually "think" like he does, else they would not have made it past graduate school and faculty hiring committees.
The Greeks and Romans knew that the purpose of learning history was to live a better life today. In the world of today's academics, this is all but forgotten. To hear it stated as a matter of fact at a professional conference was like a breath of fresh air. I do hope they accept my paper proposal next year....
This does not mean that I agreed with everything I heard. But the people I disagreed with accepted the presence of an external reality, with facts to be discerned and evaluated. This makes it possible to learn, to uphold truth and to correct one's errors. In the universe of the AHA, there is no truth, only your subjective opinion versus mine. Can you imagine such people in charge of nuclear bombs?
As to the practical consequences of this, consider: the organizer of the 2003 Columbia University conference at which a professor wished for "a million Mogadishus" was Eric Foner, Professor of History and former President of the AHA. After the applause died down, Foner did not disavow the remark. At the SMH, this would not have been applauded, to put it mildly.
For another look at History--and the origin and development of that famous statement--you know--that "those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it" (or some such words)--see WHY MOSLEMS CANNOT LEARN ANYTHING FROM HISTORY
When it comes to those who defend our freedoms (and their own), every day should--no must--be "Memorial Day"
by Alex Epstein
[First Published at "Principles and Practice" The Blog of the Objective Standard]
Every Memorial Day, we pay tribute to the American men and women who have died in combat. With speeches and solemn ceremonies, we recognize their courage and valor. But one fact goes unacknowledged in our Memorial Day tributes: all too many of our soldiers have died unnecessarily—because they were sent to fight for a purpose other than America's freedom.
The proper purpose of a government is to protect its citizens' lives and freedom against the initiation of force by criminals at home and aggressors abroad. The American government has a sacred responsibility to recognize the individual value of every one of its citizens' lives, and thus to do everything possible to protect the rights of each to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. This absolutely includes our soldiers.
Soldiers are not sacrificial objects; they are full-fledged Americans with the same moral right as the rest of us to the pursuit of their own goals, their own dreams, their own happiness. Rational soldiers enjoy much of the work of military service, take pride in their ability to do it superlatively, and gain profound satisfaction in protecting the freedom of every American, including their own freedom.
Soldiers know that in entering the military, they are risking their lives in the event of war. But this risk is not, as it is often described, a "sacrifice" for a "higher cause." When there is a true threat to America, it is a threat to all of our lives and loved ones, soldiers included. Many become soldiers for precisely this reason; it was, for instance, the realization of the threat of Islamic terrorism after September 11—when 3,000 innocent Americans were slaughtered in cold blood on a random Tuesday morning—that prompted so many to join the military.
For an American soldier, to fight for freedom is not to fight for a "higher cause," separate from or superior to his own life—it is to fight for his own life and happiness. He is willing to risk his life in time of war because he is unwilling to live as anything other than a free man. He does not want or expect to die, but he would rather die than live in slavery or perpetual fear. His attitude is epitomized by the words of John Stark, New Hampshire's most famous soldier in the Revolutionary War: "Live free or die."
What we owe these men who fight so bravely for their and our freedom is to send them to war only when that freedom is truly threatened, and to make every effort to protect their lives during war—by providing them with the most advantageous weapons, training, strategy, and tactics possible.
Shamefully, America has repeatedly failed to meet this obligation. It has repeatedly placed soldiers in harm's way when no threat to America existed—e.g., to quell tribal conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. America entered World War I, in which 115,000 soldiers died, with no clear self-defense purpose but rather on the vague, self-sacrificial grounds that "The world must be made safe for democracy." America's involvement in Vietnam, in which 56,000 Americans died in a fiasco that American officials openly declared a "no-win" war, was justified primarily in the name of service to the South Vietnamese. And the current war in Iraq—which could have had a valid purpose as a first step in ousting the terrorist-sponsoring, anti-American regimes of the Middle East—is responsible for thousands of unnecessary American deaths in pursuit of the sacrificial goal of "civilizing" Iraq by enabling Iraqis to select any government they wish, no matter how anti-American.
In addition to being sent on ill-conceived, "humanitarian" missions, our soldiers have been compromised with crippling rules of engagement that place the lives of civilians in enemy territory above their own. In Afghanistan we refused to bomb many top leaders out of their hideouts for fear of civilian casualties; these men continue to kill American soldiers. In Iraq, our hamstrung soldiers are not allowed to smash a militarily puny insurgency—and instead must suffer an endless series of deaths by an undefeated enemy.
To send soldiers into war without a clear self-defense purpose, and without providing them every possible protection, is a betrayal of their valor and a violation of their rights.
This Memorial Day, we must call for a stop to the sacrifice of our soldiers and condemn all those who demand it. It is only by doing so that we can truly honor not only our dead, but also our living: American soldiers who have the courage to defend their freedom and ours.
[NOTE by Leslie White: I placed the following preamble at the end of the post to allow the impact of the message full immediacy.]
Memorial Day Must-Read
Posted by Craig Biddle at 9:13 PM [Monday, May 29, 2006]
As swamped as I am with the journal, I'm late getting to this . . . but if you haven't read this op-ed elsewhere, then read it here. Now. This should be on every website in the country.
Copyright ©2006 Ayn Rand® Institute. All rights reserved.
Labels: Foreign Policy and War, Individual Rights and Law
Sunday, August 17, 2008
From (and more about that at) http://www.politicalislam.com/blog/the-dhimmi/
Saturday, August 16, 2008
This is only a definition. It neither suggests nor promotes such an enterprise. It is something to keep in mind though, should circumstances ever require submitting to any foreign ideology and the loss of our freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.
At present the First Amendment stands in danger of being abrogated. How? By attempts to forbid certain speech that does not agree with a foreign ideology that its adherents are trying to impose upon us*.
The "common enemy" exists already, however, he is here, and he is trying to make us submit to him. We resist him, as much as we can. He thrives on the ignorance of our populace. We do not conspire against him, we warn the people about his intent.
Why do you think our Constitution has that 2nd amendment?
The purpose of that was not so that we can go out and hunt deer.
But enough of abstractions! The gist of this post is best explained by the following excerpt from this post:
so that it may become a truly Islamic government. … By Islamic government I mean a government whose officers are Muslims who perform the obligatory duties of Islam, who do not make public their disobedience, and who enforce the rules and teachings of Islam.
Al-Banna also instructs that Muslims should "Completely boycott non-Islamic courts and judicial systems. Also, dissociate yourself from organisations, newspapers, committees, schools, and institutions which oppose your Islamic ideology." Al-Banna also condones in this book spreading Islam with violence: "Always intend to go for Jihad and desire martyrdom. Prepare for it as much as you can."
. . . were this to happen, we must re-read the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of the present post, the one that I have written here . . . and . . .
. . . the rest is silence
Regarding the 2nd Amendment:
"A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
[Note: the amendment consists of two clauses, the prefatory clause announces a purpose (A well regulated militia, etc.), but (according to the following Supreme Court decision) does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative
clause (the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed).
. . . the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed does not depend on nor is limited by that "well regulated militia" introductory clause.
Supreme Court decision of June 26, 2008
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a
firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but
does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative
clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it
connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation
of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederal-
ists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in
order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing
army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress
power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear
arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved.
(c) The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-
bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately
followed the Second Amendment. Pp. 28–30.
(d) The Second Amendment’s drafting history, while of dubious
interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals
that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms.
(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts
and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the
late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
etc., etc., etc.,
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf PDF Acrobat Format
Afterthought: By the way, what happened to the part that says " . . . and bear arms?"
Does "bear" mean "carry?" (If necessary to do so, that is?)
[emphasis mine. lw]
be sure to look at this: Can we co-exist with Islam?
http://islamicdanger4u.blogspot.com/2008/08/can-we-co-exist-with-islam-in-our-midst.html It starts with "Islam is a civilization that is entirely based upon duality and submission. Our civilization is based upon equality and freedom."
*What the Islamists are attempting to do, in this case supported by people and organizations whose grasp on reality is tenuous, is to suppress freedom of speech in the most important conflict of our time using as justification a Shari'a centric flawed logic demanding that none speak ill of "the religion of peace," in any context. From http://www.actforamerica.org/index.php/learn/recent-news/10-newsmaster/185-terror-friendly-group-cair-joins-with-leftist-church-groups-demand-government-censorship
In a National Geographic article on Persia  there is a remarkable quote: "Before they (Islam) came, we (Persia) were a great and civilized power." …Echoing commonly stated, though disputed, lore…. "They burned our books and raped our women, and we couldn't speak Farsi (the Persian language) in public or they took our tongues."
Notice the hedging of bets with the "commonly stated, though disputed lore". It is conventional wisdom, but it may not be true. There are different ways to verify whether or not Islam burned books and raped the Persian women, but one way to verify is with what police call, modus operandi, MO, method of operation. It is used in law enforcement to describe a criminal's habitual patterns and style of committing crimes. MO is common sense. Criminals, like everybody else, do what is familiar and works.
But MO is usually applied to a person. Islam's habitual patterns are preserved in its doctrine. The first great principle of Islam is that non-Muslims are kafirs. A kafir is not just an unbeliever in Mohammed's prophecy but a kafir has a special place in Islam and that place is all bad.
Islam has dualistic ethics for the kafir. A Muslim is a brother to another Muslim, but kafirs can be insulted, robbed, murdered and tortured.
Kafir women can be raped in jihad.
There are three different verses in the Koran that relate to having sex with your slaves:
Koran 70:22 Not the devout, who pray constantly and whose wealth has a fixed portion set aside for beggars and the destitute, and those who believe in the Judgment Day, and those who fear their Lord's punishment-because no one is safe from their Lord's punishment-and who control their sexual desires, except with their wives or slave-girls, with them there is no blame; but whoever indulges their lust beyond this are transgressors), and who keep their trusts and promises, and who tell the truth, and who are attentive to their prayers. These will live with honors in Gardens.
This is an interesting verse. It is an ethical list of behaviors: pray, give charity to the poor, truth telling and having sex with your slave-girls. Another verse says that even married slave girls are to be used for sex.
What is a slave? A kafir who has been captured and who has no defenders. How long do you have to hold the captive until they can be considered good for sex? Well, the Hadith as an answer has for us.
Here we see that at first the jihadists were reluctant to have sex with the captive women because of their husbands being nearby. But the Koran established that it was not immoral for them to rape kafir women because they had husbands.Abu Muslim 008, 3432Mohammed sent an army to Autas and encountered the enemy and fought with them. Having overcome them and taken them captives, the Companions seemed to refrain from having intercourse with captive women because of their husbands being kafirs. Then Allah, Most High, sent down regarding that: "And women already married, except those whom your right hands possess (iv. 24)" (i. e. they were lawful for them when their menstrual period came to an end).
How soon? On the same day according to the Sira:
Ishaq 758 Dihya had asked Mohammed for Safiya, and when he chose her for himself Mohammed gave Safiya's two cousins to Dihya in exchange. The women of Khaybar were distributed among the Muslims.Ishaq 759 A man said, 'Let me tell you what I heard the apostle say on the day of Khaybar. He got up among us and said: "It is not lawful for a Muslim to mingle his seed with another man's [meaning to have sex with a pregnant woman among the captives], nor is it lawful for him to take her until he has made sure that she is in a state of cleanness [not having her period].
As long as the kafir woman was not pregnant or having her period, the Muslim can rape her. Of course, a kafir should not even see the Muslim woman, hence, the veil, but a Muslim can have sex with a captured kafir woman. This is as good an illustration of Islam's dual ethics as any other.
The story of Islamic rape was repeated in Turkey, Eastern Europe, Egypt, Spain and Hindustan. It is going on in Africa today. Rape is the Islamic modus operandi, way of doing business.
What about the book burning? When Islam invaded Hindustan (India) the largest library in the world was at Nalanda, a Buddhist center of learning. It took days to burn the library.
After all, all kafir culture was jahiliya, ignorant and hated by Allah. Books, art and all kafir culture are despised by Allah. When Muslims destroy civilizations, they are doing a good moral work. The books destroyed in Persia and India were an affront to Islam.
The other part of cultural destruction is the elimination of languages. When Islam invaded Coptic Egypt, a kafir would have his tongue cut out for speaking Coptic in front of Islamic government officials. Today, Islam has declared war on the Berber language and culture in North Africa.
The power of jihad is its totality. Jihad goes far beyond the use of violence. It is the purpose of Islam to annihilate all kafir civilizations. This doctrine allows political Islam to be constant over time and continents. The MO of Islam is fixed by the Koran, Sira and Hadith.
 National Geographic, August 2008, Ancient Iran, pg. 62.
Here are some films with artistic value and realistic content about Islamic doctrine that are worth watching.
Not Without My Daughter American 1991This older but outstanding film has aged well with time. It has a great plot, good characterizations, dialogue, art direction and superb performances by Sally Field and Alfred Molina.
Here is Roger Ebert's in-depth review of Not Without My Daughter
The Circle Iranian 2000Iranian films are thoughtful, sophisticated and highly visual. Many of their plots are concerned with the lack of women's rights and their plight under sharia law. The opening of The Circle rates as one of the best in the history of foreign films, conveying the attitudes toward females in Islamic countries using few words and a claustrophobic location.
Here is Roger Ebert's in-depth review of The Circle.
Bill Warner, politicalislam.com
Copyright CBSX, LLC
Use this as you will, just don't edit and give us credit.
Also see "How an Arab Death Cult Crushed an Ancient Civilization"
Thursday, August 14, 2008
For "What about the loss of Russia as an ally in the war agains the jihad?" see
"When Putin, with his face still burning after the heavy slap he had received at Beslan, announced to the world that from then on he intended to strike terrorists preventively on Russian territory as well as beyond, I said to myself, “Uh-oh. We've got ourselves an ally that may cause more problems than all our enemies combined.”
The War on What?
by Zack Lieberberg
Russian people are incredibly rude. They are so rude that even when they make an effort to be polite, they sound threatening. And when they want to sound threatening, it comes out perfectly believable. When Putin, with his face still burning after the heavy slap he had received at Beslan, announced to the world that from then on he intended to strike terrorists preventively on Russian territory as well as beyond, I said to myself, “Uh-oh. We've got ourselves an ally that may cause more problems than all our enemies combined.” As it turned out, I had nothing to worry about. In the almost 19 months since the siege that left more than 344 hostages, 172 of them children, dead, Putin has been carefully emulating his more experienced colleagues. Like Sharon, he went after terrorist leaders and managed to kill a couple of them. These tough measures did about as much good to Russia as they do to Israel. The only difference was that the world did not defend the Chechen terrorists' sacred right to kill and maim their victims with the same passion they usually defend the Arab terrorists' sacred right to kill and maim theirs, which means that not only Moscow subway riders can tell a Jew from a Russian.
Like Bush, Putin managed to indict just a single participant in the attack. The man is currently on trial. Unlike my namesake Zacarias Moussaoui, Putin's defendant, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, looks human and vaguely resembles a character from That Seventies Show. This indicates that Western fashions reach Chechnya much slower than the Wahhabi ideology — a rather ominous sign if you think about it. As far as striking terrorists goes, Putin summoned all the self-discipline a martial arts expert can possibly master and managed to contain his vengeful urges. Instead of fighting a war against terrorists, he proceeded to sell modern weapons and nuclear technology to the worst terrorist states in the world. That's his war on terror.
This is only an excerpt, read the whole thing at . . .
Peacemongers and Jihadeers, Part I by Yashiko Sagamori
From MHD ROSLI BIN MOHD NORDIN MOHD NORDIN
Sent: Monday, November 13, 2006 8:40 AM
hello,i am rosli from Malaysia and i am a muslim.i had read what you had writen in the thinkisrael.com webpage.i totally disaggre the way you mention about us muslim.i think that you did not understand the true meaning of jihad.the best thing to describe islam is "islam is all about peace".the word islam itself mean peace. i want to give you a suggestion if you want to know islam better you must try to read the translation of the holy quran and observe it or you can log on to islamonline.net website to upgrade your knowledge about islam.ok may Allah give you guidance.
When someone wakes you up in the middle of the coldest, darkest night of the winter and complains how unbearable the heat of the sun has become, he is either calling you from halfway across the world or he is blind and sitting dangerously close to a blazing furnace.
When someone tells you in the year 2006 that Islam is all about peace, he can be one of many things. He can be a Jewish liberal looking at the world and the approaching Holocaust through the pink glasses of political correctness. He can be someone as ignorant and unwilling to learn as President Bush. He can be an unapologetic liar like Condoleezza Rice. He can be a ridiculously apologetic coward like Tony Blair. He can be a schizophrenic, because schizophrenics live in an alternate reality. And, last but not least, he can be a Muslim, because Dar el-Islam is an alternate reality.
If Islam is all about peace, then I would like you to explain to me why Sunni Iraqis and Shiite Iraqis, instead of uniting against American invaders, are murdering each other to the tune of several dozens a day.
If Israel is truly oppressing the so-called “Palestinians”, why are they, instead of uniting against it, are killing each other at a steadily accelerating rate?
Why did the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980's claimed more than a million lives without benefiting either side?
Why has the war between Turkish Kurds and “real” Turks, both Muslim people, killed more than 30,000? How could Abdullah Ocalan, the Muslim leader of the Kurds, declare in 1992: “Even if 100,000 people die this year, our movement cannot be disrupted,” while knowing that every single one of that impressive number of people whose lives he so easily deemed expendable was a Muslim?
How did the combined efforts of Islamic Salvation Army and Armed Islamic Group result in a civil war in Algeria that produced 150 to 200 thousand Muslim casualties between 1991 and 2002?
And look at Mecca, the holiest place of Islam, during the hajj, the holiest event of a Muslim's life. Here is a brief (and, by far, incomplete) chronology of Muslims' peaceful piousness in the modern times:
1979 November 21: On the first day of the 15th Islamic century, a group of 300 students from the Theological University of Medina take control over the Holy Mosque of Mecca. They keep control for two weeks, when 63 are captured alive and the mosque is recovered. All occupants are executed.
1987 July 31: Riots by Iranian pilgrims. More than 400 people die.
1989 July 9: Two bombs kill 1 person. Shiites of Kuwait are accused, and 16 are executed.
1990 July 2: Stampede leads to 1402 people dead.
1994: A stampede kills 400 people.
1997 April 15: Fire kills 340 people.
2004 February 1: Stampede kills 244 people.
2006 January 13: More than 345 pilgrims die in a stampede near the Jamrat Complex in Mina.
I hope you noticed that I only listed a few of the most notorious cases of Muslim violence against Muslims. Those are not isolated episodes. They are part of an ongoing process that has accompanied Islam throughout its entire history. In fact, the absolute majority of Muslims who die a violent death are not killed by “infidels”: they are slaughtered by other Muslims. Therefore, if your definition of peace has anything at all in common with mine, Islam, contrary to your opinion, is not about peace at all. If you disagree, I will be grateful if you share your definition of peace with me.
Maybe it is about deep personal beliefs? Let's see. Islam is the only religion in the modern world that accepts forced conversions. Just a few months ago, two Western journalists were abducted in Gaza and held for ransom — also a uniquely Islamic practice. While in captivity, they were given a simple choice: convert to Islam or die. They converted. Not a single person of any authority in the entire Dar el-Islam has objected against that rape. And why would they? For 14 centuries Mohammad's followers have spread Islam by the sword. For 14 centuries that worked for them. Why stop now?
I am no hero myself. I have to admit that if I were offered the same choice, I would, most probably, choose life and repeat the shahadah after my tormentors. But how would those foreign sounds that are utterly meaningless to me, sounds that were forced out of me by the gun at my temple or a knife at my throat, change the way I feel towards Islam and everything it stands for? You can force someone to follow your rituals; you can even force someone to fight on your side. But can you force a person to believe or not to believe something? No more than you can force an Islamic country into democracy, even if the entire military might of the United States is at your disposal. No, dear Rosli, Islam has nothing to do with personal beliefs.
Maybe, Islam is all about truth? I doubt that, too. You must know that Sharia expressly forbids non-Muslims to bear witness against Muslims. This means that your religious courts, and, therefore, your religion, are not interested in truth but in the Muslim domination over the “infidel”.
They say: “Become Jews or Christians if ye would be guided (To salvation).”
In reality, unlike Christianity or Islam, Judaism does not declare salvation a monopoly of its followers. Jewish law explicitly states that a gentile will go to heaven if he or she abstains from committing the seven mortal sins; a Jew, in order to go to heaven, must follow 613 commandments, including the seven mandated for gentiles. That's why, when a person approaches a rabbi asking for conversion, the rabbi's duty is to explain to the petitioner that the conversion will endanger his chances for salvation. A person desiring to become a Jew must understand the responsibility and accept it willingly and knowingly. This alone, as you can see, makes a forced conversion to Judaism even theoretically impossible.
Whether the quotation above was a deliberate lie or the result of ignorance of the man you mistook for a prophet, it certainly prevents me from accepting the idea of divine inspiration behind the text.
Maybe, Islam is all about love? I don't think so either, because Islam is the only religion in the world whose followers routinely practice “honor killings” of members of their own families. It is also the only religion in the world that does not promise family members a reunion in the afterlife. Instead, it guarantees good Muslim men a free brothel for all eternity. It does not spell out the reward for virtuous women, but does specify that dead Muslims will be segregated by gender in their X-rated heaven. Wouldn't a loving husband prefer to spend eternity surrounded by his family rather than fornicating like a priapic rabbit? He would, unless, of course, the loving husband in question is Muslim.
Maybe, Islam is about high moral standards? Not really. Even if you decide to disregard the overwhelming corruption reigning in all Islamic countries, without a single exception, as a perversion of the true faith, you must know that wine, sexual pleasures, and everything else Islam declares taboo in this life, is promised in abundance in the next one. But if something is evil here, on our sinful earth, it must be even more evil in the pristine purity of heaven. Therefore, the wrongness of the act is not the reason for the prohibitions. What is then? Here's my guess. If you forever prevent perfectly normal people from having fun, from enjoying their lives, they will be easier to control, easier to turn into “martyrs”. As you must know, this works wonderfully well.
You must also know that in Muslim countries mullahs run prostitution rings by officiating temporary “marriages” between their customers and the hookers in full compliance with Sharia. You must have heard about Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwas detailing what a man should do to an infant he raped or to domestic animals subjected to a similar treatment.
Besides, even Mohammad himself didn't rely on the high moral standards of his followers. He is quoted as saying, “When a man and a woman are in the same room together, the third person in that room is the devil.” I do not guarantee the accuracy of the quote (to the best of my knowledge, it is not found in either the Koran or Hadith), but I do know that it reflects the customary Muslim attitude: a person who has an opportunity to do wrong is not expected to resist the temptation. Don't you think that such an attitude alone makes the average Muslim enormously more immoral than the average Western teenager who manages to spend a day of fun at the beach surrounded by half (or, rather, nine-tenth) naked females without ever being tempted to rape anyone?
Maybe Islam is about charity? No, because all your charities support terrorism. After the devastating tsunami of 2004, Dar el-Harb provided tens of times more aid to its mostly Muslim victims that Dar el-Islam did.
What is Islam about then? What has Mohammad brought into the world that was unknown before he declared himself a prophet? Monotheism was discovered by the Jews millennia before Mohammad. Worshipping a mortal instead of God was practiced by Christians centuries before Mohammad succeeded in turning himself into a bloodthirsty deity. What else is there?
Having read the Koran and the Hadith long before you suggested it to me, I must tell you that Muslim sacred texts are not the best way for an outsider to acquire a practical understanding of your religion. If I wanted to help you understand Nazism or Communism, I would never invite you to start with the Mein Kampf or, respectively, Das Kapital. Instead, I would ask you to look at the Nazi atrocities during World War II or at the Communist atrocities wherever Communists came to power. And if, having learned what Nazis and Communists do, you decided to learn how they justify their crimes, then reading their propaganda materials might help you. Otherwise, you don't need to dive head first into the cesspool, no matter how curious you are about the taste of its contents.
In order to understand Islam, one doesn't need to read the Koran. One only needs to take a careful, unprejudiced look at life in Islamic countries. Or, even better, at the purest, least corrupted by Western influence implementation of Islam in modern times. I think you would agree with me that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was exactly such an implementation of Islam. Would you like to live in Afghanistan under the Taliban? Would you like to deprive the women in your family of all opportunities to go to school, to pursue a career, to walk in the streets, to be able to see a doctor when they become ill? Would you enjoy attending public executions? Would you like to take part in the stoning of an adulteress? Would you like to be told what clothes to wear, what length beard? Would you like the government to deprive you of the last vestiges of your privacy by insinuating itself into every aspect of your personal life?
As a Muslim, you probably would. But as a reasonable person you shouldn't expect people from other cultures to wish that upon themselves.
My own initial acquaintance with Islam began not with its literature, but with the experience of living in a Muslim country. I decided to read the Koran when I heard about the Islamic belief that God handed Moses not the Torah, but the Koran and that later the evil Jews maliciously rewrote the holy book. I began reading the Koran out of curiosity. I wanted to see the other vision of the Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy. I was curious if Muslims had an analogue of the Psalms or the Song of Songs.
A few years before that, I was going through a period of fascination with Russian history and politics. Russia is the biggest and, in terms of its natural resources, arguably the richest country in the world. I wanted to know how the Russians had managed to turn themselves into one of the most miserable nations on the planet. I turned to Lenin for answers. I was hoping to find in his writings a monumental vision of greatness and the clues of mistakes that had prevented that greatness from happening. Instead, I found volumes of bickering with ideological opponents, minutiae of arguments that had ended decades before I was born and could interest nobody today.
My experience with the Koran was similar to that. Instead of a different vision of the world I found fuming anger against Jews and Christians and shallow syllogisms intending to prove that the Forefathers of the Jewish people were Muslims rather than Jews. Allah in that book sounded like an insecure chieftain desperately trying to solidify his power over people who were uncertain as to whether they should submit to his will — which is exactly the situation Mohammad was in when he undertok the project of writing the Koran. The book is full of promises to his followers and threats to the rest of the human race.
And here is the most important detail that sets the Koran aside from the Torah and the New Testament. Just as the Koran never mentions Jerusalem, it doesn't contain a single reference to the Ten Commandments. All religions I am familiar with define good and evil in terms of how the believer is expected to relate to other people, whether or not they belong to the same religion. For Jews and Christians, the Ten Commandments provide the most fundamental guidance in distinguishing between good and evil. What about the Muslims? Their only measure of good is the loyalty to their prophet.
Koran 3.110 states:
Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah.
Since the right conduct is a lie and forbidding indecency is pure hypocrisy, what is left? What exactly makes you “the best community that hath been raised up for mankind”? Has there ever been a Muslim Newton? Or a Muslim Shakespeare? Or a Muslim Mozart? Or a Muslim Mother Teresa? A few Muslim names that you can name, like al-Khwarimi, could shine only in the darkness of the Dark Ages. As soon as Dar el-Harb moved forward, Dar el-Islam found itself unable to produce even a single person of any global significance, except for an enormous variety of Qaddafis, Saddams, bin Ladens, Arafats, and other Hitlers of every imaginable magnitude.
One of the most respected Muslim leaders of modern times, the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia, made a remarkable admission in his farewell speech:
We need guns and rockets, bombs and warplanes, tanks and warships for our defense. But because we are discouraged from learning of science and mathematics as giving us no merit for the afterlife, today we have no capacity to produce our own weapons for our defense. We have to buy our weapons from our detractors and enemies.
It is remarkable because it makes clear that one of the most respected Muslim leaders has no clue what motivates the people of Dar el-Harb. He would never believe that our apocalyptic (and, due to the cowardice of our leaders, absolutely useless) military might is nothing but a side effect of our insatiable curiosity about God's creation. He also inadvertently admitted that his religion is nothing but a cult of death.
And this is why I keep urging everybody who will listen to read the Koran and the Hadith, so they can see for themselves that Islam is not “just another religion” but an ideology of jihad, and jihad is not an internal strife of a Muslim for spiritual perfection, but genocide that's been going on for 14 centuries in the name of a false prophet.
And, by the way, the Arabic world Islam does not mean peace; it means submission. Can you tell the difference between the two?
Having said this all, I must add that I understand that your letter was sincere and inspired by good motives. Let me respond with a sincere suggestion. Try reading the Torah. Don't be afraid; it won't make you a Jew, just as listening to Bach won't make you a composer. But it might provide you with something you so desperately need: an alternative view of the universe.
May you find good guidance wherever you seek it.
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|December 24, 2006|